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General allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: path-independence and related topics

Author

Listed:
  • Carmen Herrero

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de Alicante, 03071 Alicante. Spain)

Abstract

We face the problem of allocationg a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We survey the three different cases studied in the literature: the pure distribution case, the redistribution case, and the gerneral case. The so called general case provide with a natural framework to analyze the idea of path-independence. In this framework, we explore the existence of rules fulfilling this property. Our first result is negative: a strong version of this property cannot be fulfilled together with efficiency. Nonetheless, some restricted versions of the path-independence property are compatible with interesting properties, in particular no manipulability, and no envy. We then identify two solutions satisfying this sort of property: the equal distance rule, and a new extension of the uniform rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmen Herrero, 2002. "General allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: path-independence and related topics," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 19-40.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:specre:v:4:y:2002:i:1:p:19-40
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martínez, 2011. "Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 453-467, December.
    2. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    3. Agustín Bonifacio, 2015. "Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 617-638, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single-peaked preferences; allocation rules; path-independence; strategy-proofness; no envy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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