Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite's (1977) theorem to correspondences. The result is interpreted as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. Alternatively, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability of correspondences.
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 3 November 1997/Accepted: 26 April 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|