Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.
Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 15 December 1997/Accepted: 16 November 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:1:p:85-93. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.