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A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation

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  • Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn

    (University of Alicante and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas)

Abstract

A spatial model of party competition is studied in which: (i) Parties are supposed to have ideology. By this we mean that their goal is to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. (ii) The policy implemented after the election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by the winner. The policy implemented should be a compromise that considers the proposals made by the different parties. In the case of proportional representation this compromise is modeled as a convex combination of the proposed policies with weights proportional to the number of votes obtained by each party. We provide some existence theorems and compare the equilibrium in our model with the equilibrium that exists under some probabilistic models. It is also shown that proportional representation will create incentives for the parties to announce radical platforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn, 1997. "A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(3), pages 427-438.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1997:i:3:p:427-438
    Note: Received: 17 May 1994/Accepted: 5 March 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2006. "Political competition when media create candidates’ charisma," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 345-366, June.
    2. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    3. Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
    4. Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September.
    5. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Christian Schultz, 2005. "Public Funding of Political Parties," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(5), pages 781-791, December.
    6. Georges Casamatta & Philippe Donder, 2005. "On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 1-29, October.
    7. Andrei Gomberg & Francisco Marhuenda & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2004. "A model of endogenous political party platforms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 373-394, August.
    8. Woojin Lee, 2008. "Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: The uni-dimensional case," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2008-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2008.
    9. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 1999. "- A Model Of Voting With Incomplete Information And Opinion Polls," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    10. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 1998. "- Ideological Versus Downsian Political Competition," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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