IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sjobre/v59y2007i1d10.1007_bf03372781.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Die Sorgfaltsanreize des Wirtschaftsprüfers bei beschränkter Haftung

Author

Listed:
  • Jochen Bigus

    (Universität Osnabrück)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung In Deutschland wird diskutiert, die Haftungsobergrenze für Wirtschaftsprüfer heraufzusetzen, in Großbritannien debattiert man ernsthaft über eine Abkehr von der unbeschränkten Haftung. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob eine beschränkte Haftung zwingend suboptimale Sorgfaltsanreize induziert. Dabei werden vier besondere Merkmale der Prüferhaftung berücksichtigt: (1) Haftung bei Verschulden, (2) Reputationsverluste bei Auftreten eines fehlerhaften Abschlusses, (3) Haftung für reine Vermögensschäden und (4) ex-ante unpräzise definierte Prüfungsstandards. Sämtliche vier Elemente wirken dem negativen Anreiz aus der Haftungsbeschränkung tendenziell entgegen. Optimale Prüfungsanreize sind trotz beschränkter Haftung möglich. Eine unbeschränkte Haftung führt regelmäßig zu übermäßiger Sorgfalt. Eine beschränkte Haftung kann ökonomisch sinnvoll sein, ohne dass man Risikoaversion des Prüfers unterstellen muss.

Suggested Citation

  • Jochen Bigus, 2007. "Die Sorgfaltsanreize des Wirtschaftsprüfers bei beschränkter Haftung," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 61-86, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:59:y:2007:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03372781
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372781
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF03372781
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF03372781?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dye, Ronald A., 1995. "Incorporation and the audit market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 75-114, February.
    2. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
    3. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
    5. Ralf Ewert & Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell, 2000. "Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation: the welfare-increasing effect of liability insurance," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 371-385.
    6. Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, 2004. "Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 263-300, July.
    7. Dye, Ronald A, 1993. "Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 887-914, October.
    8. Ralf Ewert, 1999. "Auditor Liability and the Precision of Auditing Standards," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 181-181, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Erich Pummerer & Marcel Steller & Julia Baldauf, 2013. "Prüfungsqualität, Prüferhaftung und Risikoaversion — Eine analytische Betrachtung der Bedeutung der Risikoaversion für die Prüfungsqualität," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 32-59, February.
    2. Minlei Ye & Dan A. Simunic, 2013. "The Economics of Setting Auditing Standards," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 1191-1215, September.
    3. Ray Ball, 2009. "Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 277-323, May.
    4. Chiawen Liu & Taychang Wang, 2006. "Auditor Liability and Business Investment," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(4), pages 1051-1071, December.
    5. Konstantinos Eleftheriou & Iliya Komarev & Paul Klumpes, 2023. "Regulating the Market for Audit Services: A Game Theoretic Approach," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(3), pages 697-734, September.
    6. Ralf Ewert & Alfred Wagenhofer, 2019. "Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality and Audit Quality," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 121-168, March.
    7. Reinhard Schrank, 2021. "The Impact of Damage Apportionment on Internal Control System Quality and Financial Reporting Accuracy," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 57(2), pages 251-296, June.
    8. Sebastian Kronenberger & Volker Laux, 2022. "Conservative Accounting, Audit Quality, and Litigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2349-2362, March.
    9. Ralf Ewert & Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell, 2000. "Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation: the welfare-increasing effect of liability insurance," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 371-385.
    10. John M. Barrios, 2022. "Occupational Licensing and Accountant Quality: Evidence from the 150‐Hour Rule," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 3-43, March.
    11. Lennox, Clive & Li, Bing, 2012. "The consequences of protecting audit partners’ personal assets from the threat of liability," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 154-173.
    12. Benoît Pigé, 2000. "Audit quality and Corporate governance : an analysis of French audit regulations [Qualité de l'audit et gouvernement d'entreprise : le rôle et les limites de la concurrence sur le marché de l'audit," Post-Print halshs-03425760, HAL.
    13. Moehrle, Stephen R. & Mohrman, Mary Beth & Reynolds-Moehrle, Jennifer A. & Stuerke, Pamela, 2009. "Developments in accounting regulation: A synthesis and annotated bibliography of evidence and commentary in the academic literature (1999–2000)," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 125-137.
    14. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
    15. Roee Sarel, 2022. "Crime and punishment in times of pandemics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 155-186, October.
    16. Jamel Azibi & Hamza Azibi & Hubert Tondeur, 2017. "Institutional Activism, Auditor’s Choice and Earning Management after the Enron Collapse: Evidence from France," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 10(2), pages 154-168, February.
    17. Dawson, Alexandra & Ginesti, Gianluca & Sciascia, Salvatore, 2020. "Family-related antecedents of business legality: An empirical investigation among Italian family owned SMEs," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1).
    18. Sven Hoeppner & Laura Lyhs, 2016. "Behavior Under Vague Standards: Evidence from the Laboratory," Jena Economics Research Papers 2016-010, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    19. John, Kose & John, Teresa A., 2006. "Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 71-94, April.
    20. Parker, Jeffrey S & Atkins, Raymond A, 1999. "Did the Corporate Criminal Sentencing Guidelines Matter? Some Preliminary Empirical Observations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 423-453, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    K13; M42;

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:59:y:2007:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03372781. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.