IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reaccs/v19y2014i3d10.1007_s11142-014-9290-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Discussion of “Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy”

Author

Listed:
  • Weining Zhang

    (Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business)

Abstract

Cai et al. (Rev Account Stud, forthcoming, 2014) find that firms with interlocked directors are more likely to stop quarterly forecasts and that the past stopping experience of interlocked directors affects the forecast-cessation process. Their findings are consistent with the notion that interlocked directors serve as conduits for information sharing, which may result in the change of corporate disclosure policies. My discussion focuses on potential issues with the findings and implications for future study.

Suggested Citation

  • Weining Zhang, 2014. "Discussion of “Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy”," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 1120-1124, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:19:y:2014:i:3:d:10.1007_s11142-014-9290-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11142-014-9290-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11142-014-9290-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11142-014-9290-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    2. Joel F. Houston & Baruch Lev & Jennifer Wu Tucker, 2010. "To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 4-4, March.
    3. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    4. Core, John & Guay, Wayne, 1999. "The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 151-184, December.
    5. Ye Cai & Dan S. Dhaliwal & Yongtae Kim & Carrie Pan, 2014. "Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 1086-1119, September.
    6. Chen, Shuping & Matsumoto, Dawn & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2011. "Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 134-150, February.
    7. Chen, Shuping & Matsumoto, Dawn & Rajgopal, Shiva, 2011. "Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 134-150.
    8. Joel F. Houston & Baruch Lev & Jennifer Wu Tucker, 2010. "To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 143-185, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kristian D. Allee & Theodore E. Christensen & Bryan S. Graden & Kenneth J. Merkley, 2021. "The Genesis of Voluntary Disclosure: An Analysis of Firms’ First Earnings Guidance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1914-1938, March.
    2. Francois Brochet & Maria Loumioti & George Serafeim, 2015. "Speaking of the short-term: disclosure horizon and managerial myopia," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 1122-1163, September.
    3. Jason V. Chen & Itay Kama & Reuven Lehavy, 2019. "A contextual analysis of the impact of managerial expectations on asymmetric cost behavior," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 665-693, June.
    4. Ole-Kristian Hope & Congcong Li & Mark Shuai Ma & Xijiang Su, 2023. "Is silence golden sometimes? Management guidance withdrawals during the COVID-19 pandemic," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 2319-2360, December.
    5. Chen, Jing & Jung, Michael J. & Tang, Michael, 2023. "Does lowball guidance work? An analysis of firms that consistently beat their guidance by large margins," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6).
    6. Alon Kalay, 2015. "Investor sophistication and disclosure clienteles," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 976-1011, June.
    7. Stephen A. Hillegeist & James P. Kavourakis & Matthew Pinnuck, 2023. "The association between quarter length, forecast errors, and firms’ voluntary disclosures," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(2), pages 1885-1918, June.
    8. Kannan, Yezen & Khallaf, Ashraf & Gleason, Kimberly & Bostan, Ibrahim, 2023. "The relationship between R&D intensity, conservatism, and management earnings forecast issuance," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    9. Elaine Ying Wang & Hun‐Tong Tan, 2013. "The Effects of Guidance Frequency and Guidance Goal on Managerial Decisions," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 51(3), pages 673-700, June.
    10. David Veenman & Patrick Verwijmeren, 2022. "The Earnings Expectations Game and the Dispersion Anomaly," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 3129-3149, April.
    11. Ye Cai & Dan S. Dhaliwal & Yongtae Kim & Carrie Pan, 2014. "Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 1086-1119, September.
    12. Seo, Hojun, 2021. "Peer effects in corporate disclosure decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
    13. Cready, William M. & Hu, Yaqin, 2025. "Social capital and firm voluntary disclosure," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    14. John (Jianqiu) Bai & Matthew Serfling & Sarah Shaikh, 2022. "Financial disclosure transparency and employee wages," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 751-773, November.
    15. Yongtae Kim & Myung Seok Park, 2012. "Are all management earnings forecasts created equal? Expectations management versus communication," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 807-847, December.
    16. Call, Andrew C. & Hribar, Paul & Skinner, Douglas J. & Volant, David, 2024. "Corporate managers’ perspectives on forward-looking guidance: Survey evidence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2).
    17. Thomas Bourveau & Yun Lou & Rencheng Wang, 2018. "Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 56(3), pages 797-842, June.
    18. Sun Hyun Park & Kelly Patterson, 2021. "Being Counted and Remaining Accountable: Maintenance of Quarterly Earnings Guidance by U.S. Public Companies," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 544-567, May.
    19. Mehdi Beyhaghi & Pooyan Khashabi & Ali Mohammadi, 2023. "Pre-grant Patent Disclosure and Analyst Forecast Accuracy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 3140-3155, May.
    20. Allison Koester & Russell Lundholm & Mark Soliman, 2016. "Attracting Attention in a Limited Attention World: Exploring the Causes and Consequences of Extreme Positive Earnings Surprises," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2871-2896, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:19:y:2014:i:3:d:10.1007_s11142-014-9290-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.