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Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games



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  • Marilda Sotomayor, 2010. "Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 237-248, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:237-248 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0206-1

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 95-124, July.
    2. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Mamer, John W., 1997. "Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 385-413, June.
    3. Fagebaume, Alexis & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 2010. "A note on the multiple partners assignment game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 388-392, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spa:wpaper:2013wpecon02 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Marilda Sotomayor, 2016. "Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 743-768, August.

    More about this item


    Stable allocation; Core allocation; Dual allocation; C78; D78;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation


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