The money-burning refinement: With an application to a political signalling game
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- Hans Gersbach, 2014.
"Campaigns, political mobility, and communication,"
Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 31-49, October.
- Hans Gersbach, 2009. "Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication," CESifo Working Paper Series 2834, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans Gersbach, 2011. "Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 11/143, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Martin Gregor & Dalibor Roháč, 2009. "The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(1), pages 093-113, March.
- repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0558-2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational," MPRA Paper 43410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
KeywordsC72; D72; D82; D83; Rush and delay; money-burning refinement; belief-change; signalling in politics;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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