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Stochastic games without perfect monitoring

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  • J-M Coulomb

Abstract

A two-person zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many states and actions is considered. The classical assumption of perfect monitoring is relaxed. Instead of being informed of the previous action of his opponent, each player receives a random signal, the law of which depending on both previous actions and on the previous state. We prove the existence of the max-min and dually of the min-max, thus extending both the result of Mertens-Neyman about the existence of the value in case of perfect monitoring and a theorem obtained by the author on a subclass of stochastic games: the absorbing games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

Suggested Citation

  • J-M Coulomb, 2003. "Stochastic games without perfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 73-96, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2003:i:1:p:73-96
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820300151
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Xavier Venel, 2015. "Commutative Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 403-428, February.
    3. Levy, Yehuda, 2012. "Stochastic games with information lag," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 243-256.
    4. Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.

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