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Noncooperative selection of the core

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  • Huibin Yan

Abstract

For bargaining environments given by transferable utility characteristic functions that are zero-normalized and admit a nonempty core, we find a class of random-proposer bargaining games, generalized from Okada (1993), such that there is a one-to-one mapping from these games to the core, each game realizes the corresponding core allocation as its unique (ex ante) Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE) payoff profile, and every ex post SSPE payoff profile converges to the core allocation as the discount factor goes to one. The result has a natural interpretation in terms of bargaining power. Copyright Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Huibin Yan, 2003. "Noncooperative selection of the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(4), pages 527-540, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2003:i:4:p:527-540
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820300137
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eraslan, Hülya & McLennan, Andrew, 2013. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2195-2222.
    2. Attila Ambrus & Shih En Lu, 2015. "A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 208-249, February.
    3. Arnold Polanski & Emiliya Lazarova, 2015. "Dynamic multilateral markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 815-833, November.
    4. Marco Rogna, 2022. "The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 735-768, October.
    5. Yang, Guangjing & Sun, Hao & Hou, Dongshuang & Xu, Genjiu, 2020. "A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 34-40.
    6. Yan, Huibin & Friedman, Daniel & Munro, David, 2016. "An experiment on a core controversy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 132-144.
    7. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.

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