An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure
Players that participate in a cooperative game with transferable utilities are assumed to be part of a permission structure being a hierarchical organization in which there are players that need permission from other players before they can cooperate. Thus a permission structure limits the possibilities of coalition formation. Various assumptions can be made about how a permission structure affects the cooperation possibilities. In this paper we consider the disjunctive approach in which it is assumed that each player needs permission from at least one of his predecessors before he can act. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the disjunctive permission value being the Shapley value of a modified game in which we take account of the limited cooperation possibilities.
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Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received May 1994 Revised version January 1995|
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