A Note on Balancedness and Nonemptiness of the Core in Voting Games
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- Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, "undated".
"Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets,"
03-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised May 2003.
- LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005. "Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1764, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets," IDEI Working Papers 288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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