Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures
We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters’ preferences over running candidates, a probabilistic voting procedure selects a lottery on the set of running candidates. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to withdraw their candidacy at any set of potential candidates. More flexible probabilistic voting procedures can be devised if we restrict our attention to the stability of specific sets of potential candidates. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (04)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|