A simple search model of money with heterogeneous agents and partial acceptability
Simple search models have equilibria where some agents accept money and others do not. We argue such equilibria should not be taken seriously. This is unfortunate if one wants a model with partial acceptability. We introduce heterogeneous agents and show partial acceptability arises naturally and robustly. There can be multiple equilibria with different degrees of acceptability. Given the type of heterogeneity we allow, the model is simple: equilibria reduce to fixed points in [0,1]. We show that with other forms of heterogeneity equilibria are fixed points in set space, and there is no method to reduce this to a problem in R 1 . Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Berentsen, Aleksander & Molico, Miguel & Wright, Randall, 2002.
"Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Monetary Exchange,"
68582, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berentsen, Aleksander & Molico, Miguel & Wright, Randall, 2002. "Indivisibilities, Lotteries, and Monetary Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 70-94, November.
- Trejos, Alberto & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 118-141, February.
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