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Existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium in an OLG economy

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  • Ronald Wendner

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Abstract

This paper presents sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and globally stable steady state equilibrium for OLG economies with production. The conditions impose separate requirements on the utility and production functions. Moreover, the conditions do not require assumptions concerning the third order derivatives of the production and utility functions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

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  • Ronald Wendner, 2003. "Existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium in an OLG economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(1), pages 165-174, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:165-174 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0360-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ali Khan, M. & Piazza, Adriana, 2012. "On the Mitra–Wan forestry model: A unified analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 230-260.
    2. Chen, Hung-Ju & Li, Ming-Chia & Lin, Yung-Ju, 2008. "Chaotic dynamics in an overlapping generations model with myopic and adaptive expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 48-56, July.
    3. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2011. "Public health spending, old-age productivity and economic growth: Chaotic cycles under perfect foresight," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 137-151, April.
    4. Li, Jinlu & Lin, Shuanglin, 2008. "Existence and uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium in a two-sector overlapping generations model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 255-275, July.

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