Equilibrium valuation of illiquid assets
We develop an equilibrium model of illiquid asset valuation based on search and matching. We propose several measures of illiquidity and show how these measures behave. We also show that the equilibrium amount of search may be less than, equal to or greater than the amount of search that is socially optimal. Finally, we show that excess returns on illiquid assets are fair games if returns are defined to include the appropriate shadow prices.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: June 25, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000|
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