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Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core

Author

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  • Konstantinos Serfes

    (Department of Economics, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384, USA)

Abstract

We study the process of learning in a differential information economy, with a continuum of states of nature that follow a Markov process. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically, i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new equilibrium concept, the non-myopic core. A realized agreement in each period generates information that changes the underlying structure in the economy. The results we obtain serve as an extension to the results in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1999) in a setting where agents behave non-myopically. In particular, we examine the following two questions: 1) If we have a sequence of allocations that are in an approximate non-myopic core (we allow for bounded rationality), is it possible to find a subsequence that converges to a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy? 2) Given a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy can we find a sequence of approximate non-myopic core allocations that converges to that allocation?

Suggested Citation

  • Konstantinos Serfes, 2001. "Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 333-348.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:333-348
    Note: Received: May 25, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999
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    Cited by:

    1. Askoura, Y., 2015. "An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 38-45.
    2. Youcef Askoura, 2019. "An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information: a correction," Papers 1903.09867, arXiv.org.
    3. Erik Balder & Nicholas Yannelis, 2006. "Continuity properties of the private core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 453-464, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-myopic learning; Differential information; Core.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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