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Spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing when firms avoid turning customers away

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  • Alberto Iozzi

Abstract

This paper studies a spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing when firms do not ration the supply of the good, thus extending to a spatial context the analysis of oligopolistic markets with no rationing. The paper shows the existence of the equilibrium in prices under different tie-breaking rules (TBR) and compare the features of the equilibria found under these rules, thereby allowing to highlight the importance of the choice of the TBR in studying these models. When consumers buy from the nearest firm in case of equal prices (efficient TBR), any symmetric price pair within a given range is a Nash equilibrium, with each firm serving exactly half of the market line. If demand in each local market is equally split between the firms charging the same price (random TBR), the only equilibrium price is the one that gives zero profits to each firm. The degree of competitiveness of the market crucially depends on the TBR. Under the efficient TBR, all (but one) price equilibria deliver positive profits to both firms. Under the random TBR, the market outcome is very competitive in that firms make zero profits. None of the equilibria found under any tie-breaking rule are allocatively efficient. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Iozzi, 2004. "Spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing when firms avoid turning customers away," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 38(3), pages 513-529, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:anresc:v:38:y:2004:i:3:p:513-529
    DOI: 10.1007/s00168-003-0150-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Hueth, Brent & Taylor, Christopher W., "undated". "Spatial Competition in Agricultural Markets: A Discrete-Choice Approach," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150506, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Tribl, Christoph & Morawetz, Ulrich & Salhofer, Klaus, "undated". "Spatial Competition In A Mixed Market - The Case Of Milk Processors," 2017 International Congress, August 28-September 1, 2017, Parma, Italy 260911, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Graubner, Marten & Hüttel, Silke, 2024. "Rental and sale prices of agricultural lands under spatial competition," FORLand Working Papers 29 (2024), Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation".
    4. Marten Graubner & Silke Hüttel, 2024. "Rental and sale prices of agricultural lands under spatial competition," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-12, December.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • R32 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis

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