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How to Distribute Costs Associated with a Delayed Project

Author

Listed:
  • G. Bergantiños
  • E. Sánchez

Abstract

In this paper we study how to distribute the cost caused by the delay of a project among the firms which are responsible for it. We present two rules, one based on serial cost sharing problems and the other, in game theory. Moreover, we introduce some desirable properties, inspired by well-known principles, and study which of them are satisfied by the rules. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Suggested Citation

  • G. Bergantiños & E. Sánchez, 2002. "How to Distribute Costs Associated with a Delayed Project," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 159-174, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:109:y:2002:i:1:p:159-174:10.1023/a:1016300218643
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1016300218643
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, 2012. "A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 647-657.
    2. Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2007. "Project games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 149-176, October.
      • Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2005. "Project Games," Discussion Paper 2005-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2007. "Project games," Other publications TiSEM 809ba203-2bd2-48ce-ae6d-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2005. "Project Games," Other publications TiSEM 21fd9b62-93b6-4a8b-9bf4-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Nima Zoraghi & Aria Shahsavar & Babak Abbasi & Vincent Peteghem, 2017. "Multi-mode resource-constrained project scheduling problem with material ordering under bonus–penalty policies," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(1), pages 49-79, April.
    4. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2016. "Consistency in PERT problems," MPRA Paper 68973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Mahendra Piraveenan, 2019. "Applications of Game Theory in Project Management: A Structured Review and Analysis," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(9), pages 1-31, September.

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