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Bureaucracy at the Border: The Fragmentation of United States Foreign Aid

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  • Shannon P. Carcelli

Abstract

Foreign policy scholars often assume that leaders pursue a national interest. However, states often spread their foreign policy authority thinly across bureaucracies and programs with overlapping or conflicting interests. This is especially pronounced in foreign aid, which serves a clear foreign policy purpose but is often mired in bureaucracy. Why is foreign aid often so fragmented? Focusing on the United States, I explain foreign aid fragmentation as a byproduct of domestic politics. When moderate legislators are ideologically diffuse, leadership must persuade them to support a foreign aid agenda by offering pet projects. This increases aid’s fragmentation. In contrast, when moderates are relatively homogeneous, leaders can gather support through more traditional compromise, decreasing the need for fragmented pet projects. I test this theory using a mixed-methods approach, employing a novel agency-level dataset of US foreign aid appropriations and a case study of a 1992 act delivering aid to the former Soviet Union.

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  • Shannon P. Carcelli, 2024. "Bureaucracy at the Border: The Fragmentation of United States Foreign Aid," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 68(7-8), pages 1358-1386, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:68:y:2024:i:7-8:p:1358-1386
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027231198176
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Axel Dreher & Sarah Langlotz, 2020. "Aid and growth: New evidence using an excludable instrument," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 1162-1198, August.
    2. Dietrich,Simone, 2021. "States, Markets, and Foreign Aid," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316519202, Enero-Abr.
    3. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin & Rosendorff, B. Peter & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2018. "Buying Votes and International Organizations: The Dirty Work-Hypothesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 13290, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Andreas Fuchs & Peter Nunnenkamp & Hannes Öhler, 2015. "Why Donors of Foreign Aid Do Not Coordinate: The Role of Competition for Export Markets and Political Support," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 255-285, February.
    5. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2001. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(3), pages 598-617, January.
    6. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2001. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts across Congressional Districts," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 598-617, January.
    7. Dietrich,Simone, 2021. "States, Markets, and Foreign Aid," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781009001755, Enero-Abr.
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