IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v23y2022i4p700-720.html

Shadows as leaders? The amendment success of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament

Author

Listed:
  • David Steinecke

Abstract

In light of secluded decision-making and early agreements, a binding mandate for the European Parliament’s negotiation team is essential to prevent agency loss in trilogue negotiations. In this article, I investigate the influence of the often-overlooked shadow rapporteurs on this mandate. Shadow rapporteurs are their party group’s representatives and act as checks on the rapporteur. Drawing on novel insights from network analysis, I expect shadow rapporteurs and their stance on EU integration to affect the success of amendments they are sponsoring. I draw on a novel dataset of 1524 committee amendments and employ three-level multinomial logistic regression to test these expectations. I find shadow rapporteurs to be influential policy leaders who successfully shape the committee report and, therefore, mitigate the risk of agency loss in potential trilogues. Shadow rapporteurs can successfully check the rapporteur and thereby influence the content of EU legislation.

Suggested Citation

  • David Steinecke, 2022. "Shadows as leaders? The amendment success of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 23(4), pages 700-720, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:23:y:2022:i:4:p:700-720
    DOI: 10.1177/14651165221121739
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14651165221121739
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/14651165221121739?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierpaolo Settembri & Christine Neuhold, 2009. "Achieving Consensus Through Committees: Does the European Parliament Manage?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 127-151, January.
    2. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:127-151 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Steffen Hurka & Maximilian Haag, 2020. "Policy complexity and legislative duration in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 87-108, March.
    4. Tsebelis, George & Jensen, Christian B. & Kalandrakis, Anastassios & Kreppel, Amie, 2001. "Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 573-599, October.
    5. Frank M Häge & Nils Ringe, 2020. "Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 706-727, December.
    6. Tom Delreux & Thomas Laloux, 2018. "Concluding Early Agreements in the EU: A Double Principal†Agent Analysis of Trilogue Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 300-317, March.
    7. Ariadna Ripoll Servent & Lara Panning, 2019. "Preparatory Bodies as Mediators of Political Conflict in Trilogues: The European Parliament’s Shadows Meetings," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(3), pages 303-315.
    8. Ariadna Ripoll Servent & Lara Panning, 2019. "Preparatory Bodies as Mediators of Political Conflict in Trilogues: The European Parliament’s Shadows Meetings," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(3), pages 303-315.
    9. Michael J. Hanmer & Kerem Ozan Kalkan, 2013. "Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 263-277, January.
    10. Lukas Obholzer & Steffen Hurka & Michael Kaeding, 2019. "Party group coordinators and rapporteurs: Discretion and agency loss along the European Parliament’s chains of delegation," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 239-260, June.
    11. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & Gérard Roland, 2007. "Democratic politics in the European Parliament," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7744, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Damien Pennetreau & Thomas Laloux, 2021. "Talkin’ ‘bout a Negotiation: (Un)Transparent Rapporteurs’ Speeches in the European Parliament," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(1), pages 248-260.
    2. Steffen Hurka & Maximilian Haag & Constantin Kaplaner, 2023. "Proposal complexity and report allocation in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 307-326, June.
    3. Lukas Obholzer & Steffen Hurka & Michael Kaeding, 2019. "Party group coordinators and rapporteurs: Discretion and agency loss along the European Parliament’s chains of delegation," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 239-260, June.
    4. Frank M Häge & Nils Ringe, 2020. "Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 706-727, December.
    5. Stefan Thierse, 2016. "Going on record: Revisiting the logic of roll-call vote requests in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 17(2), pages 219-241, June.
    6. Jonathan B Slapin, 2014. "Measurement, model testing, and legislative influence in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 24-42, March.
    7. Rory Costello & Robert Thomson, 2010. "The policy impact of leadership in committees: Rapporteurs’ influence on the European Parliament’s opinions," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 219-240, June.
    8. Stephan Huber & Nihit Goyal & Thomas Hoppe & Tamara Metze, 2025. "How issue salience and political leadership facilitate policy integration: The adoption of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive in the European Union," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 58(4), pages 753-772, December.
    9. Nicola Maaser & Alexander Mayer, 2016. "Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 213-237, January.
    10. Nikoleta Yordanova, 2011. "The European Parliament: In need of a theory," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(4), pages 597-617, December.
    11. Robin Schädler & Gijs Jan Brandsma, 2021. "Some Are more Equal than Others: Report Allocation to Members of the European Parliament from New Member States," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 697-720, May.
    12. Léa Roger & Simon Otjes & Harmen van der Veer, 2017. "The financial crisis and the European Parliament: An analysis of the Two-Pack legislation," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(4), pages 560-580, December.
    13. Mihail Chiru, 2024. "Seniority and Ideological Proximity? A Longitudinal Analysis of the Appointment of Party Group Coordinators in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 127-141, January.
    14. Christine Neuhold & Guri Rosén, 2019. "Introduction to “Out of the Shadows, Into the Limelight: Parliaments and Politicisation”," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(3), pages 220-226.
    15. Johanna Kantola & Cherry Miller, 2021. "Party Politics and Radical Right Populism in the European Parliament: Analysing Political Groups as Democratic Actors," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 782-801, July.
    16. Steffen Hurka, 2013. "Changing the output: The logic of amendment success in the European Parliament’s ENVI Committee," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 273-296, June.
    17. Damien Pennetreau & Thomas Laloux, 2021. "Talkin’ ‘bout a Negotiation: (Un)Transparent Rapporteurs’ Speeches in the European Parliament," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(1), pages 248-260.
    18. Lukas Obholzer & Moritz Wiesenthal, 2024. "Roll call votes in the committees of the European Parliament: A new dataset," European Union Politics, , vol. 25(4), pages 799-815, December.
    19. Christophe Crombez & Pieterjan Vangerven, 2014. "Procedural models of European Union politics: Contributions and suggestions for improvement," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 289-308, June.
    20. Fang-Yi Chiou & Silje SL Hermansen & Bjørn Høyland, 2020. "Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 233-254, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:23:y:2022:i:4:p:700-720. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.