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A Conjecture on Institutional Rationalities and Property Rights in Public Procurement of Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Ågren

    (Lund University - Department of Construction Sciences)

  • Max Rolfstam

    (Aalborg University - Department of Business and Management.)

Abstract

The increased interest in using public procurement as a policy tool for innovation has renewed a need for understanding the procurement process. A conjecture on institutional rationalities and property rights is offered to explain the hurdles present for conducting successful procurement projects. If an efficient negotiation solution is to be achieved, participants in procurement projects need to be aware of the other participants’ institutional rationalities and actively consider these while concluding the terms of procurement projects. Consequently, future policy efforts towards increased innovation have to be targeting the process of public procurement of innovation, rather than focusing on regulatory issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Ågren & Max Rolfstam, 2013. "A Conjecture on Institutional Rationalities and Property Rights in Public Procurement of Innovation," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 2, pages 137-157, April-Jun.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2013:i:2:p:137-157
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public procurement; institutions; property rights; innovation; bargaining games.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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