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Union Integration Paths

Author

Listed:
  • Massimo Morelli

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

This paper proposes a theoretical explanation for the incremental integration path of Europe until the Monetary Union time. The dynamic partition function game suggests that the presence of externalities across coalitions affects the timing of admission of different players, the equilibrium coalition structure, and the equilibrium length of the admission game. In particular, at the early stages of integration it is reasonable to believe that the bargaining power of the founders was not so high as to make the admission process resemble a sequential ultimatum game, and in such a context the admission path is always a sequencing admission path.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Morelli, 2012. "Union Integration Paths," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 3, pages 7-25, July-Sept.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2012:i:3:p:7-25
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luque, Jaime & Morelli, Massimo & Tavares, José, 2014. "A volatility-based theory of fiscal union desirability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-11.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    coalition; union; externalities; side payments; commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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