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Il metodo aggregativo-compensatore come criterio di aggiudicazione di aste


  • Pier Angelo Mori

    () (Università di Firenze)


The paper studies first-score auctions awarded under the aggregative compensating method. We show that equilibria display various anomalies which are caused by the competitors that are unable to reach either the first or the second position in the bid ranking. While such competitors are irrelevant when an absolute-evaluation criterion is employed, under this criterion their behaviour affects the winner’s and the second high bidder’s bidding strategies and can invert their ranking too. In a word, equilibria are generally not robust to variations in irrelevant participants’ behavior. Such problems raise serious doubts on the appropriateness of this scoring rule for awarding auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Pier Angelo Mori, 2012. "Il metodo aggregativo-compensatore come criterio di aggiudicazione di aste," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 1, pages 311-346, January-M.
  • Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:y:2012:i:1:p:311-346

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    More about this item


    multidimensional auctions; relative evaluation;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation


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