Il metodo aggregativo-compensatore come criterio di aggiudicazione di aste
The paper studies first-score auctions awarded under the aggregative compensating method. We show that equilibria display various anomalies which are caused by the competitors that are unable to reach either the first or the second position in the bid ranking. While such competitors are irrelevant when an absolute-evaluation criterion is employed, under this criterion their behaviour affects the winner’s and the second high bidder’s bidding strategies and can invert their ranking too. In a word, equilibria are generally not robust to variations in irrelevant participants’ behavior. Such problems raise serious doubts on the appropriateness of this scoring rule for awarding auctions.
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Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-March)
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