A Schumpeterian Model of Wage Inequality and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement
This paper addresses the concern of whether the determinants of patent infringement and declaratory judgement suits may affect both long-term economic performance and wage inequality. In doing so, we construct a quality-ladder R&D-based endogenous growth model, in which the institutional setting for patent protection directly impacts the long-run private incentive to conduct R&D as well as to invest in human capital. We find that both the institutional setting and the Court's behaviour exacerbate wage inequality, while the steady-state effects on R&D effort and long-run growth are mixed.
Volume (Year): 95 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (September-October)
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