Controllo familiare, struttura finanziaria e crescita delle imprese
Opinions in economic theory about the role of family firms are divergent. Trust among family members may mitigate agency pro-blems within the firm, but limit its growth due to the lack of both financial and managerial resources. In order to identify the existence of differences between family and other privately owned industrial firms, we rely on a survey car-ried out in 2002 by the Bank of Italy. No differences in profitabi-lity are detected. However, family firms show a lesser leverage and a slower growth. As their owners are concerned with maintaining control, they are forced to give up some investment opportunities.
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Volume (Year): 94 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (September-October)
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