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Unicidad del equilibrio de Nash-Cournot bajo correspondencias contractivas de mejor respuesta

Author

Listed:
  • Elvio Accinelli

    (Universidad Autonoma de San Luis Potosi)

  • Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

    (University of Siena, ITALY)

Abstract

En este trabajo se muestran condiciones para la unicidad del equilibrio de Nash-Cournot para un juego de n-firmas. Estas condiciones garantizan que las funciones de mejor respuesta para n-firmas que compiten en forma oligopolica a la Cournot sean contracciones y generalizan las condiciones de concavidad generalmente consideradas para este fin.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvio Accinelli & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2007. "Unicidad del equilibrio de Nash-Cournot bajo correspondencias contractivas de mejor respuesta," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 4(1), pages 43-57, Julio-Dic.
    • Handle: RePEc:qua:journl:v:4:y:2007:i:1:p:43-57
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mejor respuesta; contraccion; equilibrio de Cournot; unicidad.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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