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Temps partiel féminin et incitations financières à l'emploi

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  • Bernard Salanié
  • Guy Laroque

Abstract

[fre] Nous présentons un modèle de la participation féminine, qui prend en compte le temps partiel et l'effet du salaire minimum. Ce modèle est estimé sur les données de l'enquête Emploi de 1997. On l'applique à la comparaison de divers dispositifs d'incitation à l'emploi : l'allocation compensatoire de revenu, l'impôt négatif, les subventions aux bas salaires et la prime pour l'emploi. [eng] Female part-time work and financial incentives We present a model of female participation in the labor force, which deals with part time work and the minimum wage. The model is estimated on the French employment survey of 1997. We use it to compare various incentive schemes to work: the "allocation compensatoire de revenu", the negative income tax, subsidies to low wages and the "employment bonus".

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Salanié & Guy Laroque, 2002. "Temps partiel féminin et incitations financières à l'emploi," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(6), pages 1127-1147.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_6_410463 Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2002.410463
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    1. Maxim Engers & Steven Stern, 2002. "Long-Term Care and Family Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 73-114, February.
    2. Schoeni, Robert F, 1997. "Private Interhousehold Transfers of Money and Time: New Empirical Evidence," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 43(4), pages 423-448, December.
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    6. McGarry, K. & Schoeni, R.F., 1995. "Transfer Behavior With the Family: Results from the Asset and Health Dynamics Survey," Papers 95-09, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
    7. Schoeni, R.F., 2000. "Support Networks within the Family As a Public Good Problem," Papers 00-06, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
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    9. Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elena G. F. Stancanelli, 2006. "Les couples sur le marché de l'emploi. Une analyse exploratoire des années récentes," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 99(4), pages 235-272.
    2. Cyrille Hagneré & Nathalie Picard & Alain Trannoy & Karine Van der Straeten, 2003. "L'importance des incitations financières dans l'obtention d'un emploi est-elle surestimée ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, pages 49-78.
    3. Elena G. F. Stancanelli & Henri Sterdyniak, 2004. "Un bilan des études sur la Prime pour l'emploi," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 88(1), pages 17-41.
    4. Frédéric Berger & Bruno Jeandidier, 2003. "Accompagner une réforme fiscale : avec une Prime pour l'emploi ou avec une hausse des Allocations familiales ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, pages 103-119.
    5. Guy Laroque & Bernard Salanie, 2002. "Labour market institutions and employment in France," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(1), pages 25-48.
    6. Sébastien Vermare & Bérengère Junod-Mesqui & Marion Cochard & Franck Arnaud, 2008. "Les effets incitatifs de la prime pour l'emploi : une évaluation difficile," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 412(1), pages 57-80.
    7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10017 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C34 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure

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