IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Confiance, réciprocité et cheap talk


  • Claude Meidinger
  • Stéphane Robin
  • Bernard Ruffieux


[fre] Confiance, réciprocité et cheap talk. . La microéconomie standard donne une vision particulière des relations de confiance : elles ne peuvent exister sans mécanisme incitatif. Dans un cadre expérimental où aucun support incitatif de la théorie standard n'est présent et où la confiance permet un gain mutuel, le jeu dynamique de l'investissement montre que certains individus sont disposés à faire confiance et que d'autres sont incités à la réciprocité en présence de manifestations de confiance. Un modèle de jeu statique, reposant sur un concept d'équilibre de bienveillance réciproque, révèle une situa­tion d'information incomplète et éclaire les comportements des joueurs. Une seconde expérience introduit une communication cheap talk. Les résultats confirment l'existence d'informations incomplètes et révèlent les difficultés que rencontrent les joueurs à se coordonner sur des issues Pareto-optimales. [eng] Trust, reciprocity, and cheap talk. . Standard microeconomics implies a particular view of trust between agents: it can only exist under incentive mechanisms. In the experiment reported in this paper, the Dynamic Investment Game, in which such standard incentive mechanisms are not present but in which trust can lead to mutual gains, we find that certain individuals exhibit trust and thereby induce others to reciprocate. A static game theoretic model with incomplete information which contains a concept of fairness equilibrium more accurately describes behaviour in the experiment than the standard model. We further study behavior in this game with a second series of experiments in which cheap talk is permitted. Our results confirm the existence of incomplete information and reveal certain difficulties in coordinating on Pareto-optimal equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Meidinger & Stéphane Robin & Bernard Ruffieux, 1999. "Confiance, réciprocité et cheap talk," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(1), pages 5-44.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_1_410061

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_1_410061. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.