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Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice

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  • Lin Song
  • Zhenlei Yu
  • Qiang He

Abstract

Doctors and patients are the two critical players in medical malpractice. The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With change in different parameters, the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model was demonstrated using Vensim simulation. The results show that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost of strategies of different doctors are the key factors affecting doctor–patient evolutionary game system. Medical malpractice can be reduced by adjusting the weight of different strategy choices, increasing the penalties for illegal practices, and standardizing medical malpractice costs based on doctors’ standardized practice income. Measures to effectively resolve medical malpractice are proposed by introducing a third-party normative system, establishing a doctor–patient information management system, and improving doctors’ reward and punishment mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Lin Song & Zhenlei Yu & Qiang He, 2023. "Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(3), pages 1-15, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0282434
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0282434
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    References listed on IDEAS

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