On the Intergovernmental Fiscal Game
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- Guy Gilbert & Yvon Rocaboy, 2004.
"The central government grant allocation problem in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 137-147, July.
- Yvon Rocaboy & Guy Gilbert, 2004. "The central government grant allocation problem in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating," Post-Print halshs-00068990, HAL.
- Ann Cavlovic & Harriet Jackson, "undated". "Bother thy neighbour? Intergovernmental Tax Interactions in the Canadian Federation," Working Papers-Department of Finance Canada 2003-09, Department of Finance Canada.
- Besfamille, Martin, 2004. "Local public works and intergovernmental transfers under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 353-375, January.
- Rosella Levaggi & Francesco Menoncin, 2015. "Would less solidarity justify present calls for devolution?," Working papers 32, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
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