Representative vs. Direct Democracy and Government Spending in a Median Voter Model
Combining economics and the political process, demand-oriented median voter models provide a framework for analyzing local government budgetary behavior. Using observations from Illinois townships (operating under representative democracy) and Minnesota townships (operating under direct democracy), the institutional structure of collective decision-making in the provision of essential rural road services is studied. Institutional structure was found to be important in analyzing local government behavior with a median voter model. The difficulty of reducing a complex tax system into a representative tax-price variable proved to be a limiting factor in obtaining more conclusive results.
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Volume (Year): 44 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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