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Self-Protection, Information and the Precautionary Principle


  • Giovanni Immordino

    ([1] Gremaq, Université de Toulouse [2] CSEF, University of Salerno, V. Ponte Don Melillo 80084 Fisciano, Italy)


In this paper we examine the effect of information on investment in self-protection. We show that the relationship between more information and investment in self-protection is ambiguous in general. If absolute risk aversion is constant, then investment in self-protection always decreases with a better information structure. We show that if we interpret the Precautionary Principle as requiring more self-protection today, it is difficult to accept it on the grounds of efficiency, except for a particular subset of information structures. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (2000) 25, 179–187. doi:10.1023/A:1008770530165

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Immordino, 2000. "Self-Protection, Information and the Precautionary Principle," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(2), pages 179-187, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:25:y:2000:i:2:p:179-187

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Takao Asano, 2010. "Precautionary Principle and the Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy Under Ambiguity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 173-196, October.
    2. Pauline Barrieu & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2006. "On Precautionary Policies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(8), pages 1145-1154, August.
    3. Fidel Gonzalez, 2008. "Precautionary Principle and Robustness for a Stock Pollutant with Multiplicative Risk," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(1), pages 25-46, September.
    4. Ozlem Ozdemir, 2007. "Valuation of Self-Insurance and Self-Protection under Ambiguity: Experimental Evidence," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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