IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Of Altruists and Thieves

  • Brian T Kench


    (University of Tampa, Tampa, FL 33611, USA.)

  • Neil B Niman


    (University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, 03824, USA.)

We replicate List's [2007] baseline dictator game (DG) with subjects earning their endowment, evaluate the effect of decreasing the stakes of the DG, conduct a DG in which taking is the only option, measure dictators’ ex post perceptions, and impose a social distance framing effect. Dictator behavior is influenced when they earn their endowment and when the stakes of the game are changed, but not when a social distance framing effect is imposed. Our results suggest that dictators have been nudged into demonstrating altruistic tendencies in the standard DG, just as our taking treatment has nudged dictators to become thieves.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: Link to full text PDF
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

File URL:
File Function: Link to full text HTML
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 36 (2010 Summer)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 317-343

in new window

Handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:317-343
Contact details of provider: Web page:

Order Information: Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK
Web: Email:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:36:y:2010:i:3:p:317-343. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Daniel Foley)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.