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Judicial Reform


  • Juan Carlos Botero
  • Rafael La Porta
  • Florencio LÛpez-de-Silanes
  • Andrei Shleifer
  • Alexander Volokh


A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countries shows that those seeking to improve economic performance should not focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence as well. It also shows that the level of resources poured into the judicial system and the accessibility of the system have little impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem of judicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overly complicated procedures. Incentive-oriented reforms that seek to increase accountability, competition, and choice seem to be the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentives alone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicial stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing their flexibility. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Botero & Rafael La Porta & Florencio LÛpez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Alexander Volokh, 2003. "Judicial Reform," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 61-88.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:wbrobs:v:18:y:2003:i:1:p:61-88

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    Cited by:

    1. Mitsopoulos, Michael & Pelagidis, Theodore, 2007. "Does staffing affect the time to dispose cases in Greek courts?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 219-244.
    2. Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina & Grajzl, Peter & Slavov, Atanas & Zajc, Katarina, 2016. "Courts in a transition economy: Case disposition and the quantity–quality tradeoff in Bulgaria," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 18-38.

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