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Corporate Governance Externalities

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  • Viral V. Acharya
  • Paolo F. Volpin

Abstract

When firms compete in the managerial labor market, the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects, and is affected by, the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance offer managers more generous incentive compensation, which induces firms with good governance to also overpay their management. Due to this externality, overall level of governance in the economy can be inefficiently low. Poor governance can in fact be employed by incumbent firms to deter entry by new firms. Such corporate governance externalities have important implications for regulatory standards, ownership structure of firms, and the market for corporate control. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Viral V. Acharya & Paolo F. Volpin, 2010. "Corporate Governance Externalities," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-33.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:14:y:2010:i:1:p:1-33
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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