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Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev

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  • Gulnaz Sharafutdinova

Abstract

This study examines federal reforms in Putin's Russia under the framework of principal-agent model. It establishes the rationale and intended outcomes of these reforms and then describes their real consequences. The main findings bear on the nature of changes in the gubernatorial body, regional political regimes and the new challenges for the regime emerging from these reforms. The study demonstrates that (i) most governors survived this change in the first four years after the reform; (ii) the elimination of gubernatorial elections undermined political competition in the regions, forcing it away from public sphere to less transparent venues and (iii) new problems emerged as a result of reforms, particularly, the need for a systematic mechanism of cadre formation and the problem of moral hazard. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

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  • Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, 2010. "Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 40(4), pages 672-696, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:40:y:2010:i:4:p:672-696
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjp036
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    Cited by:

    1. Koenig, Christoph, 2015. "Competence vs. Loyalty: Political survival and electoral fraud in Russia’s regions 2000–2012," Economic Research Papers 270014, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Vasilyeva Olga & Nye John V.C., 2013. "In imperfect democracies, does political competition always improve the provision of public goods?," EERC Working Paper Series 13/09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. Koenig, Christoph, 2019. "Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 433, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    4. Grigorii V Golosov, 2018. "Russia’s centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 21(3), pages 231-248, September.
    5. André Schultz & Alexander Libman, 2015. "Is there a local knowledge advantage in federations? Evidence from a natural experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 25-42, January.
    6. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Political Loyalty Vs Economic Performance: Evidence from Machine Politics in Russia’S Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 34/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    7. Gorgulu,Nisan & Sharafutdinova,Gulnaz & Steinbuks,Jevgenijs, 2020. "Political Dividends of Digital Participatory Governance : Evidence from Moscow Pothole Management," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9445, The World Bank.
    8. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.
    9. Barbara Krug & Alexander Libman, 2015. "Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies: Russia and China compared," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 221-245, June.

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