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Corporate Control in Germany

Listed author(s):
  • Schneider-Lenne, Ellen R
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    The article presents the German system of corporate control. Compared with the UK, the number of listed joint-stock companies in Germany is relatively low. The most important shareholders are companies, whereas institutional investors play a minor role. An essential feature of German corporate culture is the concept of the interest of the company as a whole and the long-term approach in pursuing company goals. Joint-stock companies operate under a two-tier structure with a managing board controlled by the supervisory board, the body which plays the central role in corporate governance in Germany. In contrast to what is widely believed, German banks do not dominate companies even though they exert considerable influence through industrial holdings, supervisory board mandates and proxy voting rights in addition to their regular banking business. Control via the market is less pronounced here than in the UK but is growing in importance. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

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    Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.

    Volume (Year): 8 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
    Pages: 11-23

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    Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:11-23
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