IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxford/v8y1992i3p11-23.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporate Control in Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Schneider-Lenne, Ellen R

Abstract

The article presents the German system of corporate control. Compared with the UK, the number of listed joint-stock companies in Germany is relatively low. The most important shareholders are companies, whereas institutional investors play a minor role. An essential feature of German corporate culture is the concept of the interest of the company as a whole and the long-term approach in pursuing company goals. Joint-stock companies operate under a two-tier structure with a managing board controlled by the supervisory board, the body which plays the central role in corporate governance in Germany. In contrast to what is widely believed, German banks do not dominate companies even though they exert considerable influence through industrial holdings, supervisory board mandates and proxy voting rights in addition to their regular banking business. Control via the market is less pronounced here than in the UK but is growing in importance. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Schneider-Lenne, Ellen R, 1992. "Corporate Control in Germany," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 8(3), pages 11-23, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:11-23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tylecote, Andrew & Hirata, Mitsuhiro, 1993. "Technological Innovation and Performance Pressures in Europe and Japan," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, December.
    2. Aleksandra Jovanovic, 2001. "Legal rules, governance structures and financial systems," ICER Working Papers 19-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    3. Branston, J. Robert & Cowling, Keith & Sugden, Roger, 2002. "Corporate Governance And The Public Interest," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 626, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. William R. Emmons & Frank A. Schmid, 1998. "Universal banking, allocation of control rights, and corporate finance in Germany," Working Papers 1998-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:11-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oxrep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.