IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxford/v30y2014i3p492-512..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Closing coal: economic and moral incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Collier
  • Anthony J. Venables

Abstract

Climate policy requires that much of the world’s reserves of fossil fuels remain unburned. This paper makes the case for implementing this directly through policy to close the global coal industry. Coal is singled out because of its high emissions intensity, low rents per unit value, local environmental costs, and sheer scale. Direct supply policy—the sequenced closure of coal mines—may lead to less policy leakage (across countries and time) than other policies based on demand or price management. It also has the advantage of involving relatively few players and leading to clear-cut and observable outcomes. Appropriately sequenced closure of the world coal industry could, we suggest, create the moral force needed to mobilize collective international action.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Collier & Anthony J. Venables, 2014. "Closing coal: economic and moral incentives," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 30(3), pages 492-512.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:30:y:2014:i:3:p:492-512.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oxrep/gru024
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Derek Lemoine, 2017. "Green Expectations: Current Effects of Anticipated Carbon Pricing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 99(3), pages 499-513, July.
    2. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2008. "Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 360-394, August.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    4. Michael Jakob & Robert Marschinski & Michael Hübler, 2013. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Trade-Theory Analysis of Leakage Under Production- and Consumption-Based Policies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(1), pages 47-72, September.
    5. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
    6. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2012. "The Green Paradox: A Supply-Side Approach to Global Warming," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262016680, December.
    7. Bård Harstad, 2012. "Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 77-115.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Simeon Djankov & Edward Glaeser & Valeria Perotti & Andrei Shleifer, 2022. "Property Rights and Urban Form," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(S1), pages 35-64.
    2. Michael Lazarus & Harro van Asselt, 2018. "Fossil fuel supply and climate policy: exploring the road less taken," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 1-13, September.
    3. Sen, Suphi & von Schickfus, Marie-Theres, 2020. "Climate policy, stranded assets, and investors’ expectations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    4. Celine de Quatrebarbes & Bertrand Laporte, 2015. "What do we know about the mineral resource rent sharing in Africa?," CERDI Working papers halshs-01146279, HAL.
    5. Suphi Sen & Marie-Theres von Schickfus, 2017. "Will Assets be Stranded or Bailed Out? Expectations of Investors in the Face of Climate Policy," ifo Working Paper Series 238, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    6. Santos, Georgina, 2017. "Road transport and CO2 emissions: What are the challenges?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 71-74.
    7. Upasak Das & Prasenjit Sarkhel & Sania Ashraf, 2020. "Love Thy Neighbor? Perceived Community Abidance and Private Compliance to COVID-19 Norms in India," Papers 2010.12350, arXiv.org.
    8. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2016. "Second-best carbon taxation in the global economy: The Green Paradox and carbon leakage revisited," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 85-105.
    9. Pfeiffer, Alexander & Millar, Richard & Hepburn, Cameron & Beinhocker, Eric, 2016. "The ‘2°C capital stock’ for electricity generation: Committed cumulative carbon emissions from the electricity generation sector and the transition to a green economy," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 1395-1408.
    10. Bergholt, Drago & Røisland, Øistein & Sveen, Tommy & Torvik, Ragnar, 2023. "Monetary policy when export revenues drop," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    11. Bård Harstad, 2020. "Trade and Trees: How Trade Agreements Can Motivate Conservation Instead of Depletion," CESifo Working Paper Series 8569, CESifo.
    12. Heerma van Voss, Bas & Rafaty, Ryan, 2022. "Sensitive intervention points in China's coal phaseout," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    13. Philippe Le Billon & Païvi Lujala & Devyani Singh & Vance Culbert & Berit Kristoffersen, 2021. "Fossil fuels, climate change, and the COVID-19 crisis: pathways for a just and green post-pandemic recovery," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(10), pages 1347-1356, November.
    14. Philipp M. Richter & Roman Mendelevitch & Frank Jotzo, 2018. "Coal taxes as supply-side climate policy: a rationale for major exporters?," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 43-56, September.
    15. Huang, Lingbo & Tiezzi, Silvia & Xiao, Erte, 2022. "Tax liability side equivalence and time delayed externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    16. Kim Collins & Roman Mendelevitch, 2015. "Leaving Coal Unburned: Options for Demand-Side and Supply-Side Policies," DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 87, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    17. Laporte, Bertrand & de Quatrebarbes, Céline, 2015. "What do we know about the sharing of mineral resource rent in Africa?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(P2), pages 239-249.
    18. Lassi Ahlvik & Jørgen Juel Andersen & Jonas Hveding Hamang & Torfinn Harding, 2022. "Quantifying supply-side climate policies," Working Papers No 01/2022, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
    19. Sivan Kartha & Simon Caney & Navroz K. Dubash & Greg Muttitt, 2018. "Whose carbon is burnable? Equity considerations in the allocation of a “right to extract”," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 117-129, September.
    20. Srivastav, Sugandha & Zaehringer, Michael, 2023. "The Economics of Coal Phaseouts," INET Oxford Working Papers 2023-17, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    21. Upasak Das & Prasenjit Sarkhel & Sania Ashraf, 2022. "Love Thy Neighbour? Perceived Community Abidance and Private Compliance to COVID-19 Norms in India," South Asia Economic Journal, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, vol. 23(1), pages 30-51, March.
    22. Kinda, Harouna & Thiombiano, Noël, 2024. "Does transparency matter? Evaluating the Impacts of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) on Deforestation in Resource-rich Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    23. Roman Mendelevitch, 2018. "Testing supply-side climate policies for the global steam coal market—can they curb coal consumption?," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 57-72, September.
    24. Kühne, Kjell & Bartsch, Nils & Tate, Ryan Driskell & Higson, Julia & Habet, André, 2022. "“Carbon Bombs” - Mapping key fossil fuel projects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    25. Philippe Le Billon & Berit Kristoffersen, 2020. "Just cuts for fossil fuels? Supply-side carbon constraints and energy transition," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 52(6), pages 1072-1092, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paul Collier & Anthony J. Venables, 2014. "Closing coal: economic and moral incentives," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 492-512.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:30:y:2014:i:3:p:492-512.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oxrep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.