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Tax responses in platform industries

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Jarle Kind
  • Marko Koethenbuerger
  • Guttorm Schjelderup

Abstract

Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known result of tax incidence is that consumers of a more heavily taxed good pay a higher price and thus buy less of the good. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad valorem tax may lower end-user prices and spur sales. Thus, two-sided platform firms may not at all engage in tax shifting via price increases. We further show that a higher ad valorem tax may undermine a firm's incentive to differentiate its product from that of its competitors. Finally, we demonstrate that the effects of increasing specific taxes may be the opposite of those of increasing value added taxes. Copyright 2010 Oxford University Press 2010 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Jarle Kind & Marko Koethenbuerger & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2010. "Tax responses in platform industries," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 764-783, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:62:y:2010:i:4:p:764-783
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpq008
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Belleflamme & Eric Toulemonde, 2016. "Tax Incidence on Competing Two-Sided Platforms: Lucky Break or Double Jeopardy," CESifo Working Paper Series 5882, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Roberto Bombana & Carla Marchese, 2014. "Designing fees for music copyright holders in radio services," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(2), pages 5-19.
    3. repec:hrv:faseco:33078973 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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