The Provision of Information as Marketing Strategy
The authors study the disclosure of information about product characteristics as part of firms' competitive strategy. A model of a differentiated products duopoly is constructed in which firms may choose whether or not t o reveal the attributes of their product to consumers with heterogeneous tastes. The authors analyze the implications of disclosure versus nondisclosure for firms' profits and consumer welfare, and identify the Nash equilibrium marketing st rategies corresponding to different competitive conditions. They also consider an expanded game in which firms initially select their product types. Copyright 1986 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 38 (1986)
Issue (Month): 0 (Suppl. Nov.)
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