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Police militarization and local sheriff elections

Author

Listed:
  • Christos Mavridis
  • Orestis Troumpounis
  • Maurizio Zanardi

Abstract

We investigate how transfers of military equipment in the United States through the 1033 Program impact the electoral performance of sheriffs that receive a significant share of equipment while directly accountable to voters. To address this question, we have compiled a unique dataset covering 7281 sheriff elections in 2714 counties between 2006 and 2016. Our findings indicate that an increase in military transfers to the sheriff’s office, from no transfers to the 25th percentile, increases the probability of the incumbent being reelected by 5.8–12.5 percentage points. This is due to an increase in the number of votes cast for the incumbent while there is no effect on the total number of voters participating in the election. Our heterogeneity results demonstrate that voters tend to reward military equipment transfers, especially when local newspapers are present and in Republican-leaning small counties, providing novel insights into voter responsiveness in local elections (JEL D72, H56, H76, K42).

Suggested Citation

  • Christos Mavridis & Orestis Troumpounis & Maurizio Zanardi, 2025. "Police militarization and local sheriff elections," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 823-847.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:41:y:2025:i:3:p:823-847.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewae004
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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