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Information and the Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims: A Competing Risks Analysis

Author

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  • Paul Fenn
  • Neil Rickman

Abstract

We use a competing risk model to explore the relationship between information about case strength and the speed with which medical malpractice disputes are resolved. We have data on the time to resolution of such disputes in a group of English hospitals and how each dispute is resolved (drop, settlement, or trial). We also have detailed data on the evolution of expert assessments of case strength and the timing of external experts’ reports that are designed to share information and that, therefore, might be expected to influence litigation outcomes. We find that litigation encourages dropping and settling of cases over time in a systematic way relating to their assessed strength; cases that involve relatively little uncertainty are resolved faster than those where liability is more unclear. We suggest that this evidence is consistent with the litigation process using time to help sort, and deal with, cases according to their strength. (JEL: C72, K41).

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman, 2014. "Information and the Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims: A Competing Risks Analysis," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(2), pages 244-274.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:30:y:2014:i:2:p:244-274.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewt002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Samantha Bielen & Wim Marneffe & Peter Grajzl & Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl, 2018. "The Duration of Judicial Deliberation: Evidence from Belgium," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(2), pages 303-333, June.
    2. Luke Garrod & Bruce Lyons, 2016. "Early Settlement in European Merger Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 27-63, March.
    3. Peter Grajzl & Katarina Zajc, 2017. "Litigation and the timing of settlement: evidence from commercial disputes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 287-319, October.
    4. Bielen, Samantha & Grajzl, Peter & Marneffe, Wim, 2017. "Procedural events, judge characteristics, and the timing of settlement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 97-110.
    5. Samantha Bielen & Peter Grajzl & Wim Marneffe, 2017. "Understanding the Time to Court Case Resolution: A Competing Risks Analysis Using Belgian Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 6450, CESifo.
    6. Lara Wemans & Manuel Coutinho Pereira, 2018. "How long does it take to enforce a debt in the Portuguese judicial system?," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles and Banco de Portugal Economic Studies, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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