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The Distributional Consequences of Diversity-Enhancing University Admissions Rules

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  • Erik Eyster

Abstract

This article examines public attitudes toward university admissions rules by focusing on the imposition of the costs of racial diversity across majority citizens. High-income majority citizens, who tend to have better academic qualifications, favor more diversity under affirmative action, which imposes its costs on marginal majority candidates. Low-income majority citizens prefer less diversity under affirmative action and would rather achieve diversity by de-emphasizing academic qualifications. Increasing income inequality among majority citizens tends to reduce the median citizen's support for affirmative action. Our results help explain why affirmative action has become increasingly unpopular among white voters and why white voters who oppose affirmative action may support top-x-percent rules like those recently introduced in California, Florida, and Texas. (JEL D72, D78, I23) The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Eyster, 2009. "The Distributional Consequences of Diversity-Enhancing University Admissions Rules," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 499-517, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:25:y:2009:i:2:p:499-517
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewp004
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Johanna Mollerstrom, 2022. "Favoritism and cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 293-307, June.
    2. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions

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