Fight Against Corruption: Sanctions Regimes of Multilateral Development Banks
Much has been written about the consequences for companies of criminal convictions for bribery and other corrupt practices. However, less attention has been paid to the sanction regimes that have been developed by multilateral development banks (MDBs) in order to combat fraud and corruption in their operations. This may change in view of the fact that, on 9 April 2010, the heads of five leading MDBs--the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank--signed an agreement providing for mutual and reciprocal enforcement of debarment decisions. The Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (the 'Agreement') thus increased the risk faced by commercial organizations that do business in the developing world, while affirming the MDBs' commitment to combating fraudulent, corrupt and collusive practices. Consequently, companies will need to invigorate their procedures with a view to managing their risks not only in relation to national legislation, but also in relation to the MDBs' sanctioning authorities, which have much broader geographic scope than that of national legislations such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or the UK Bribery Act. This article first provides a brief history of anti-corruption measures taken by the MDBs and examines the tenets of collective enforcement action established by the Agreement. Further, as the signatories of the Agreement continue to maintain their own sanctions mechanisms, the article analyses the individual sanctions systems of each of the five signatories of the Agreement. Finally, the article describes the types of sanctions that may be imposed by MDBs and looks at some of the challenging issues surrounding MDBs' sanctions practices. Oxford University Press 2012, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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