Political Monetary Cycles and Independence of the Central Bank in a Monetary Union: An Empirical Test for a BEAC Franc Zone Member Country
This paper attempts to study the interactions between economic decisions and political motivations of incumbent Cameroonian governments from 1960 to 1992 within the framework of a political monetary cycle. It analyses the causes of such cycles and their consequences for the independence of the Central Bank of the monetary union to which Cameroon belongs. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 6 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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