The problem of market bias in modern capitalist economies
Modern societies are presently facing a number of challenging and often contentious issues regarding how to organize and govern a variety of activities that employ a substantial and growing fraction of their resources. In certain cases, to make market organization work satisfactorily will require strong and fine-grained regulation, and perhaps a number of other supplementary non-market elements. For other activities, it would be best to rely centrally on other basic organizational modes, with markets in an ancillary role. In these latter cases, too strong an adherence to a belief in the general efficacy of simple market organization can hinder the achievement of a satisfactory solution. The central purpose of this essay is to call attention to the complexity and variegation of the sectoral or activityspecific governing structures employed by modern capitalist economies, and to argue that such structures need to be tailored to the details of the activities involved. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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