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Producers' Loss Due to Asymmetric Information: An Application to a Specific Case


  • Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette
  • Ossard, Herve


In this paper we estimate the loss of revenue to producers due to asymmetric formation in markets for perishable agricultural products. The theoretical framework is the first-price auction model with the independent private values Paradigm Following Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), we use a structural approach. We compute the loss to producers, that is, the extra profit of the buyer due to asymmetric information. Our results indicate that the buyer's informational rent is about 10 per cent of the observed price. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette & Ossard, Herve, 1998. "Producers' Loss Due to Asymmetric Information: An Application to a Specific Case," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 155-169.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:155-69

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    Cited by:

    1. John M. Crespi & Richard J. Sexton, 2004. "Bidding for Cattle in the Texas Panhandle," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 660-674.
    2. Kobus, Pawel, 2012. "Modelling yield risk measures of major crop plants," 123rd Seminar, February 23-24, 2012, Dublin, Ireland 122535, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

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