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Co-operation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty

Author

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  • Andrea Gallice
  • Ignacio Monzón

Abstract

We present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Since agents realise that their own action may be observed, they have an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. The same environment leads to full co-operation in the prisoners’ dilemma.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Gallice & Ignacio Monzón, 2019. "Co-operation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2137-2154.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:129:y:2019:i:621:p:2137-2154.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.12636
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    Cited by:

    1. Monzón, Ignacio, 2019. "Observational learning in large anonymous games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    2. Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024. "Position uncertainty in a sequential public goods game: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(4), pages 820-853, September.
    3. Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib & Bruno, Jorge & Foucart, Renaud & SenGupta, Sonali, 2025. "Efficient public good provision between and within groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 183-190.
    4. Laura Doval & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2020. "Sequential Information Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2575-2608, November.
    5. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Hinnosaar, Toomas & Vigier, Adrien, 2022. "The Limits of Limited Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 17307, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Jacopo Bizzotto & Toomas Hinnosaar & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "The Limits of Commitment," Working Papers 202206, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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