Primary and Secondary Reform
An import competing industry hires lobbyists to obtain protection, where binding quotas may be utilized in the trade regime. Rent seekers compete with one another to obtain valuable import licenses. Rent seeking and lobbying are assumed to involve similar skills so that a reform of the rent-seeking sector will have feedback effects on lobbying and vice versa. The authors show that the feedback effects from reform targeting the lobbying activity (primary reform) often tend to reinforce the original reform, while reforms targeting the rent-seeking sector (secondary reform) tend to have negative feedback effects on the reform process. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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